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I. IN TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GABRIEL WILNER
We all have those teachers that inspired and empowered us. Professor
Gabriel Wilner was one of those teachers for me. A life changing moment
came in my second year of law school when we were holding a public event
in 1988 on the anniversary of Cuban Missile Crisis. We invited Dean Rusk,
President Kennedy’s Secretary of State, and Louis B. Sohn, renowned
international law scholar who helped draft the United Nations Charter, to
present a panel discussion. I was President of the Georgia Society of
International and Comparative Law, which was hosting the event. Professor
Wilner came to me and said, “Mr. Birdwell, of course you are going to
moderate the program.” My response was: “Moderate? Me? Who am I to
moderate a discussion among these giants?” Professor Wilner would hear no
resistance. The event ended up being one of the great thrills of my cherished
time at the University of Georgia School of Law. This is but one example of
the many opportunities that Professor Wilner created for his students to step
onto the world stage of international law and human rights.
II. ABOUT THIS ARTICLE
The premise of this Article is that one of the most effective development
strategies to unleash unprecedented global economic growth is to create the
right environment for capital markets to thrive. The Article also argues that
the single most effective use of a capital market authority’s resources is to
build and empower a robust law enforcement program. Finally, this Article
will offer fourteen specific steps that governments and their securities
authorities can take to provide a legal foundation—including model statutory
provisions—for building and developing a world-class enforcement program
that will help unleash the fullest potential of a capital market.
III. INTRODUCTION
What is the most effective development strategy that governments and
non-government organizations can employ to unleash the fullest potential of
capital markets to maximize economic growth? There seven billion people
on the planet, and we will add another billion in about thirteen years.1 About
1
World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision; Frequently Asked Questions, U.N.
DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, http://esa.un.org/wpp/Other-Information/faq.htm (last
updated Oct. 31, 2011).

2011]

A ROADMAP FOR EMERGING MARKETS

539

half live in poverty on less than $2.50 a day.2 About thirty-six million
people still die every year from malnutrition and preventable diseases due to
lack of clean water.3 There are an enormous amount of jobs to create,
mouths to feed, houses to build, power to generate, and resources to extract.
The magnificent Edward O. Wilson notes that “[f]or every person in the
world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing technology
would require four more planet Earths.”4 Security, justice, dignity, and
environmental protection5 will be incomplete until these basic human needs
are met in all corners of the world.
Governments are concerned with taking the actions necessary to improve
the business environment and legal infrastructure that will facilitate the
development of technology and infrastructure necessary to meet humanity’s
basic needs. The economic activity necessary will dwarf all previous
historical efforts and must be self-sustaining. While governments must play
a crucial role in setting the stage, this effort will require unleashing the
private sector’s fullest potential. The premise of this article is that wellpoliced, competitive, and innovative capital markets must be at the center of
this whirlwind of activity. Securities markets are a way in which
entrepreneurs and businesses can search for low cost financing—often
unavailable from banks—to fuel their enterprises.6 The source of that
financing is investors, who look to the stock markets to generate higher rates
of return than may be available from other sources and to diversify their
holdings. These marketplaces thrive when they are characterized by honesty,
integrity, disclosure, and transparency.

2

Poverty Analysis, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow “Topics”
hyperlink; then follow “Poverty”; then follow “Poverty Analysis”) (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
3
Press Release, Comm. on Human Rights, Independent Expert on Effects of Structural
Adjustment, Special Rapporteur on Right to Food Present Reports; Commission Continues
General Debate on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/CN/1064 (Mar. 29,
2001).
4
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 23 (2002).
5
Economic growth does not have to be inconsistent with preserving the environment. In
fact, economic growth is essential for long-term protection of the environment because the
environment will always be a secondary priority so long as there are desperate humans
seeking basic necessities for their families.
6
See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 702 (1995) (“[A
securities market] enables the holder of loans to raise funds at a lower cost than had it
borrowed [from banks, for example] on its own credit. . . . [S]ecuritization can lower the cost
of funding . . . .”).
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In terms of capital, the economic growth necessary to meet these needs
cannot be fueled by bank lending alone. As a source of capital, bank lending
has its strengths, but the banking model is insufficient to meet the financial
needs of a fast-growing, innovative economy. Banks tend to be risk averse
and not particularly transparent in their operations. These two characteristics
substantially reduce the utility of bank lending to power the economic
growth necessary to meet humanity’s basic needs. Banks tend to be risk
averse because of the mismatch between their liabilities, which tend to be
short-term, and their assets, which are often illiquid.7 However, this risk
aversion results in many economically productive and high-value added
projects not being financed, even though the potential returns may well
justify the risks. The failure to fund such efforts can greatly hamper
economic growth.8
The lack of transparency in banking is due, in part, to the individualized
nature of the many loan transactions into which they enter. To require full
public disclosure of the details of these transactions would be prohibitively
costly and unnecessarily compromise the proprietary or private information of
loan recipients. Yet, the lack of transparency in bank lending means that the
details concerning important investment opportunities are kept behind closed
doors and tend to be held captive by a handful of market intermediaries.9
Indeed, in some developing countries that are dominated by bank lending, in
my opinion, there have been decades of lost opportunity for greater economic
growth. It is not that banking does not have an important role to play in
providing capital; rather, it is that public capital markets also provide a crucial
component to efficient capital formation and economic growth.10 Moreover,
7

Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2010)
(“[B]anks rely on short-term credit (deposits) to invest in a portfolio of longer-term assets
(loans) . . . .”).
8
See John K. Lawrence & Dickinson Wright, The Federal Government’s Response to the
Credit Crisis, SP042 ALI-ABA 459, 550 (2009) (“[If] banking organizations retreat from
making sound credit decisions, the current market conditions may be exacerbated, leading to
slower growth and potential damage to the economy . . . .”).
9
See Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
923, 953–54 (2010) (“In particular, three developments threaten the effectiveness of capital
market discipline: a decline in transparency, an increase in the percentage of equity held by
investor intermediaries, and a decrease in accountability.”).
10
See Thorsten Beck, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Stock Markets Versus
Banks?, PROPARCO’S MAG., Mar. 2010, at 23, available at http://www.ffem.fr/jahia/webdav/site/
proparco/shared/PORTAILS/Secteur_prive_developpement/PDF/SPD5_PDF/ProparcoRevue%2
005UK%20WEB%20020410Beck.pdf%20article%20Beck.pdf (recognizing that, while there are
some studies that suggest that developing stock markets over banking is the superior
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vibrant capital markets will also inform bank lending, serving not as
competition, but as a complement to bank lending’s role in the economy.
Contrast the banking model with the economic benefits of wellfunctioning public markets for securities in which both risk and opportunity
for return are open to any investor, are priced in a public arena with
mandatory disclosure requirements for material information, and inform the
economic decisions of a wide array of market participants and economic
enterprises.11 This publicly shared information and public pricing of
opportunities acts like a neuronal network in coordinating the many
production and consumption decisions in the economy. In this context,
capital flows more efficiently and more rapidly to where the opportunities for
return justify the risks. Thomas Friedman aptly describes the movement of
capital as the “Electronic Herd” that migrates to graze at the most productive
pastures.12 They move in when conditions are right and move out just as
quickly when conditions deteriorate.13 Nothing will send capital fleeing
more quickly than the high costs associated with an unfavorable regulatory
environment and endemic fraud.14 Investors will always be available to
assume the risk of the enterprise, but they will not readily assume the risk of
losing their investment to fraud. The role of the government and public
policy makers is to create the environment that will keep the electronic herd
in your pasture.
A long line of recent studies found a positive correlation between stock
market development and economic growth.15 The authors of a 2007
development strategy to pursue, most studies indicate that the mutual complementarities
associated with developing both the banking and stock market sectors carries the greatest
benefit).
11
See David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of
Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 453 (“[W]e should understand mandatory
disclosure regimes as the regulatory effort to increase transparency and thereby increase
informational efficiency of markets.”).
12
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 112 (2000).
13
Id. at 113.
14
See, e.g., Kroll, Global Fraud Report (2011), available at http://www.krollconsulting.
com/insights-reports/global-fraud-reports/. This year’s survey found that fraud concerns had
dissuaded 48% of respondents (in a survey of 800 executives) from operating in at least one
region or country. Id. at 4. Those geographies most frequently mentioned were China, from
which 11% of respondents had been deterred, Africa with 11%, and Latin America with 10%.
Id. at 6. The leading worry—corruption—dissuaded more than one in six businesses from
operating elsewhere: for that reason 63% stayed away from Africa, and 59% avoided Central
Asia based on that concern. Id.
15
See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal & Hamid Mohtadi, Financial Markets and the Financing
Choice of Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries, 15 GLOBAL FIN. J. 57 (2004)
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper find that “improvements
in trading of shares . . . or liquidity on African stock markets will on the
whole boost economic growth by 3.7 percentage points.”16 This research
suggests that these countries could double the size of their economy in
twenty years, above the growth they would already achieve, solely by
concentrating on improving their stock markets. The studies identify a range
of outstanding benefits that a well-functioning stock market can provide to
an economy:
●

●

Savings Mobilization17—savings is encouraged “by
providing individuals with an additional financial
instrument that may better meet their risk preferences and
liquidity needs”
Liquidity—increased liquidity means that “initial investors
do not lose access to their savings for the duration of the
investment project because they can easily, quickly, and
cheaply, sell their stake in the company”18 (as Professor
Ross Levine19 puts it: “investors will come if they can
leave”20)

(examining twenty-one emerging markets over eighteen years and finding stock market
development contributes to economic growth both directly in both the long- and short-term);
Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, Capital Markets: An Engine for Economic Growth, 5
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 33 (1998); Soumya Guha Deb & Jaydeep Mukherjee, Does Stock
Market Development Cause Economic Growth? A Time Series Analysis for Indian Economy,
21 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 1442 (2008) (setting forth causality test results that suggest that
stock market development leads to economic growth in the Indian economy); Akinlo A.
Enisan & Akinlo O. Olufisayo, Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Evidence
from Seven Sub-Sahara African Countries, 61 J. ECON. & BUS. 162 (2009); Ross Levine &
Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV.
323 (1996); Muhammad Shahbaz et al., Stock Market Development and Economic Growth:
Ardl Causality in Pakistan, 14 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 182 (2008) (finding a very strong
relationship between stock market development and economic growth).
16
Charles Amo Yartey & Charles Komla Adjasi, Stock Market Development in SubSaharan Africa 16 (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 209, 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07209.pdf.
17
Id. at 14.
18
Id. at 5.
19
Ross Levine is the James and Merryl Tisch Professor of Economics and Director of the
William R. Rhodes Center for International Economics and Finance at Brown University.
Ross Levine, RESEARCH AT BROWN: DIRECTORY OF RESEARCH & RESEARCHERS AT BROWN,
http://research.brown.edu/research/profile.php?id=1130162236 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
20
Ross Levine, Stock Markets: A Spur to Economic Growth, 33 FIN. & DEV. 7 (1996).
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Risk Diversification—more financial products are
available, which can also facilitate investments in highreturn projects21
Information Dissemination—securities markets acquire
and disseminate information efficiently through company
disclosures and through the stock prices of companies22
Corporate
Governance—is
improved
through
23
transparency and disclosure
Long-Term Capital—is perpetually available for both
government and private sector industrial and infrastructure
projects24
Lower cost of capital—is available to growing companies
(so long as the market operates efficiently)25
Reduced risk of credit crunches—because companies are
less dependent on bank financing26
Efficiency—securities markets allocate capital to
productive investments, leading to economic growth27

Given that securities markets can dramatically increase economic growth
and development, and may well be the most efficient and powerful engine
for economic growth in existence, the next questions should be: What can
governments do to create a favorable environment for a stock market to
thrive at its fullest potential? What international best practices can be
identified and adopted to give developing markets the opportunity to leap
ahead and build world class financial markets without having to suffer the
decades of growing pains, mistakes, and periodic crises that have
characterized the historical development of the most advanced markets?28
This Article argues that the answers lie primarily in developing the
enforcement capacity of the security authority. The premise is that a
government’s best strategy is to focus on protecting investors through a
21

Levine & Zervos, supra note 15, at 327.
Yartey & Adjasi, supra note 16, at 4.
23
Id. at 25.
24
Id. at 5.
25
Id. at 4.
26
Id.
27
Bekaert & Harvey, supra note 15, at 1.
28
For an excellent discussion of the lessons from the latest financial crisis, see John H.
Walsh, Combating Fraud in the Caribbean Region: Lessons from Recent Events, 3 GEO.
MASON J. INT’L L. 116 (2011).
22
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robust enforcement program, and to leave the business decisions and most
“market development” initiatives to the collective decision making of the
capital market participants. While there are undoubtedly many capital
markets that would benefit from demutualization, regionalization, and
automation, the enduring problem with most capital markets today is that
they are operating at only a fraction of their potential because they are rife
with fraudulent behavior and abuse, including financial disclosure and
accounting fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, pyramid schemes and
customer abuse by market intermediaries. An IMF Working Paper reviewing
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) Assessments
in seventy-four countries found that “a consistent theme emerges regarding
the lack of ability of regulators in many countries to effectively enforce
compliance with existing rules and regulations” which the authors
characterize as the “overriding weakness.”29 These market abuses and
fraudulent schemes render capital markets unable to function the way they
are supposed to and incapable of generating the benefits outlined above.
This Article focuses on identifying those strategies and tools that a securities
authority can employ to create a clean and honest market that is a prerequisite for driving the economic growth that is so important.
IV. WHY ENFORCEMENT ENHANCES MARKET DEVELOPMENT
There are two competing philosophies driving securities authorities. The
first, and perhaps most prevalent, is the view of securities authorities who see
their role as primarily regulatory; that is, they emphasize the regulation of the
business conduct of the market intermediaries whom they regulate, but they
place less emphasis on bringing enforcement actions.30 This, by the way, is
also characteristic of most banking regulatory authorities whose driving
philosophy is safety and soundness. This approach was represented most
visibly, at least until recently, by the United Kingdom’s Financial Services
Authority, which considered itself “emphatically not an enforcement-led
regulator.”31 In stark contrast, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
29

Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliot, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market
Regulation: A Global Analysis 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 107/259, 2007), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf.
30
See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 350 (2010)
(discussing the prevalence of the regulatory view and the lesser-used enforcement approach).
31
John Tiner, Chief Exec., Fin. Servs. Auth., Address at the FSA Enforcement Law
Conference (June 16, 2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communicatio
n/Speeches/2006/0616_jt.shtml.
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(SEC) is “first and foremost . . . a law enforcement agency.”32 Enforcement
represents the SEC’s largest program area and most visible public face.33
The mission of most securities authorities includes promoting market
development.34 Given this focus, many developing market regulators may
argue that the emphasis on enforcement would not work because as a smaller
market trying to develop and compete they do not want to stifle and burden
their market. This Article argues that this argument is flawed. The Article’s
conclusion is that a strong emphasis on enforcement by markets at any level
of development is the key to market growth and prosperity.
A. Enforcement Lowers the Cost of Capital
Every securities market has varying degrees of financial disclosure and
accounting fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, customer abuses by
broker-dealers and investment advisors, and pyramid schemes. There will be
companies and their principals that will try to “cook their books” and hide
their true state of affairs from the public with omissions, half-truths, and
outright lies. There will be market manipulators who distort stock prices
through misrepresentations, while buying or selling their own stock at the
artificial prices. There will be insider traders that buy or sell with an unfair
and anti-competitive information advantage, potentially giving the
impression to the average investor that the market is unfairly rigged. There
will be boiler-rooms that make cold calls to investors and convince them to
buy the next “sure thing,” and there will be pyramid scheme operators who
rally investors around fictitious investments and use new investor funds to
pay off old investors rather than investing in a real venture. A compliance
officer at a large international securities firm once told me that he recognized
that, given the scale of the operations of the firm it was likely that at any
given time an employee was engaged in wrongdoing, such as front-running,
churning (excessive buying and selling that generates excessive wealthdestroying fees), or unauthorized transactions in client accounts. These are
the abuses that eat away at capital markets, destroy investor confidence, and
increase the cost of capital. The fraudsters may represent a small minority of
32

The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
33
Id.
34
For example, the U.S. SEC’s mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Id.
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a market, but this small minority can ruin the market for everyone because
customers and investors cannot determine who is telling the truth.
Numerous capital markets have stagnated because their securities
authorities have insufficient powers to address the fraud and abuse described
above. Most capital markets are suffering from what Nobel Laureate
economist George Akerlof once described as the “lemons problem.”35 Any
market characterized by an asymmetry of information between the buyers
and the sellers—where the sellers know much more than the buyers about
what is being sold—can suffer from this problem (like the market for used
cars). In a securities market, the problem is that—since the buyers cannot
tell who is being honest regarding the quality of financial instruments and
services being offered and who is being dishonest—buyers are only willing
to pay a price that reflects the expectation that they might be deceived. As
Professor Black describes it:
Investors don’t know which companies are truthful and which
aren’t, so they discount the prices they will offer for the shares
of all companies. . . . Discounted share prices mean that an
honest issuer can’t receive fair value for its shares, and has an
incentive to use other forms of financing. But discounted
prices won’t discourage dishonest issuers. . . . The tendency
for high-quality issuers to leave the market because they can’t
obtain a fair price for their shares, while low-quality issuers
remain, worsens the lemons or “adverse selection” problem
that investors face. Investors rationally react to the lower
average quality of issuers by discounting still more the prices
they will pay. This drives even more highquality [sic] issuers
out of the market and exacerbates adverse selection.36
Professor Black further explains that:
[M]any nations have not developed an acceptable solution to
this problem [of informational asymmetry]. Their securities
markets have instead fallen into what insurance companies call
a “death spiral,” in which information asymmetry and adverse
35

George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
36
Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS.
LAW. 1565, 1567–68 (2000).
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selection combine to drive almost all honest issuers out of the
market and to drive share prices to zero. In [those] countries, a
few large companies may develop reputations sufficient to
justify a public offering of shares at a price that, though below
fair value, is still attractive compared to other financing
options. But smaller companies have essentially no direct
access to public investors’ capital. They must obtain capital
from intermediaries (usually banks), or through the internal
capital market of a conglomerate group, or else grow only at
the rate permitted by reinvestment of past earnings.37
In sum, the prevalence of fraud and abuse can destroy a securities market,
as investors continue to further discount the prices they are willing to pay for
securities, while the honest issuers flee for the exits.38 For those issuers that
remain in such a market, this results in a higher cost of capital.39 This is
highly damaging to a country’s economic prospects. Businesses will not
engage in real investment (in plant and equipment, infrastructure, training
and so forth) unless the expected rate of return from such projects exceeds
the cost of capital.40 As a consequence, a high cost of capital results in very
little real investment. This means less job creation, lower incomes, and less
economic growth than there would be otherwise. If the cost of capital can be
decreased, businesses have an incentive to increase real investment, resulting
in more jobs, higher income, and greater economic growth.41 If a country
can reduce the prevalence of fraudsters in its capital market, it will
dramatically lower its cost of capital and thereby stimulate economic growth.
37

Id. at 1570–71.
See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 944 (1998) (“[I]f
investors are unable to distinguish high quality issues from low quality issues due to a lack of
disclosure or unduly weak insider trading laws, investors may discount the price of all issues.
This may drive leading high quality issues to more favorable regimes that allow them to
distinguish themselves from the low quality issues.”).
39
See id. (“To the extent [fraud] occurs, investors may withdraw from the market, which
decreases market liquidity and raises the cost of capital.”).
40
Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1112 (1999) (“[A business] should reinvest profits only when the new
projects promise expected returns at a level equal to or in excess of the corporation’s cost of
capital.”).
41
See Robert W. McGee, Principles of Taxation for Emerging Economies: Lessons from
the U.S. Experience, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 29, 76 (1993) (describing the positive correlation
between increased investment and employment, income, and economic growth rates).
38
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The good news is that enforcement tools are the most productive and
cost-effective means of cleaning out fraud and abuse and, thus, of lowering
the cost of capital.42 Recent studies demonstrate that the “enforcement
intensity” of a securities regulator lowers the cost of capital.43 For example,
the U.S. securities market achieves an extremely low cost of capital due, in
part, to its vigorous enforcement program.44 Similarly, a study of the
European Union’s implementation of the market abuse directives and
transparency regulations found that “market liquidity increases and firms’
cost of capital decreases” and that these positive effects were largely
dependent on the degree of enforcement.45 Professor Coffee explains this
using a “bonding hypothesis” whereby stock issuing companies seek out
markets with strong enforcement so they can bond to a quality regulator.46 In
bonding, companies are providing an implicit assurance to investors that they
can have a relatively higher degree of confidence that the stock price is fairly
and accurately priced. This lowers their cost of capital.47 The important
lesson here is that the studies have shown that having the best rule books in
the world will not reduce the cost of capital—only enforcement of those rules
lowers the cost of capital. This bonding hypothesis strongly suggests that an
important way to facilitate market development and capital formation is to
focus resources on developing an enforcement program that achieves visible
results. The emphasis on enforcement is not only fully consistent with
market development but also a necessary condition.

42
John Coffee, ‘Regulation-Lite’ Belongs to a Different Age, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2008),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe8950a6-c776-11dc-10b4-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1JifQj792
(“Ultimately, stricter enforcement yields . . . a lower cost of capital [resulting in] a higher
gross domestic product and lower unemployment.”).
43
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 230 (2007) (“[H]igher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost
of capital and higher securities valuations.”); see also Uptal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk,
The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2008) (finding the cost of equity is reduced
by approximately 5% if insider trading laws are enforced); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe,
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN.
ECON. 207 (2009).
44
Coffee, supra note 43.
45
See Hans B. Christensen et al., Capital Market Effects of Securities Regulation: The Role
of Implementation and Enforcement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16737,
Jan. 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16737.
46
Coffee, supra note 43, at 235.
47
Id.
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B. Enforcement Is Efficient
On one hand, equity markets can be extraordinarily innovative and
dynamic and—may flourish best if allowed to run untethered to government
restraints. Certainly, to be innovative and efficient, the private sector
generally needs an atmosphere in which executives and managers can make
and execute operational and capital decisions without needing to seek prior
governmental approval or being second-guessed by the government. On the
other hand, history, experience, and theory suggest that capital markets are
magnets for fraud and abuse, conflicts of interest, systemic risks, and other
imperfections and that the government is in the best position to correct these
problems and level the playing field. What, then, is the correct philosophy or
optimal balance that securities authorities should pursue?
All indications suggest that securities authorities, if they have not already
done so, would be best served by shifting their regulatory philosophy from a
primarily ex ante approach to a more ex post approach. Many securities
authorities, particularly those that seem to adopt a banking regulator
mentality, tend to micromanage their market on the one hand, while largely
failing to sufficiently punish wrongdoers in the marketplace in order to deter
future market misconduct on the other hand. With ex ante regulation, a
regulated entity’s business decisions are subject to merit-based pre-approvals
by the securities authority.48 Such ex ante regulation imposes costs,
uncertainty and delay, not only on potential wrongdoers, but also on all
honest market participants.49 Moreover, market growth and innovation will
be dragged down by the finite staff and resources of the regulatory authority
as they are unable to keep up with the authorizations, licenses, and
applications.50 At the same time, because such an approach is not welltargeted at preventing wrongdoing, there are still market failures and frauds.
In sum, the ex ante approach to regulation typically fails in its effort to “play
it safe” and, at the same time, hinders market development. Indeed, it is the
worst approach to developing a market.

48

See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1279 (1999) (describing the workings of
an ex ante preclearance regulatory scheme).
49
Id. at 1316 (“[E]x ante enforcement by its nature imposes delay since preview and
approval takes time, and during that time activity must be suspended. This delay is in itself
costly to society since the economic (or other) benefits of the regulated activity are foregone
or deferred.”).
50
Id. at 1320.
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In contrast, an ex post approach to regulation takes the government out of
private sector decisions and focuses first and foremost on enforcement as a
means of punishing and deterring market abuse, customer abuse, and fraud.
An ex post approach has the great advantage in that it places most of the cost
of abuse on those that commit it, rather than on the honest players and the
market as a whole. Similarly, an enforcement-led approach prioritizes
precious public and regulatory resources into going after the violators,51
which are, after all, the source of the problems. Simply put, to develop the
marketplace, securities authorities need to increase the expected costs on the
dishonest market participants while lowering costs for the honest players.
While attention should be paid to carefully crafting cost-effective
regulation and supervision systems that reduce conflicts of interest and
opportunities for fraud and abuse, without a credible threat of sanctions and a
demonstrable track record of successful enforcement actions, it is certain that
rules will not be obeyed, thereby undermining the authority of both the
regulation and the regulator. Some have charged that the U.S. SEC
“regulates through enforcement.” U.S. SEC staff counter that they are
simply “enforcing the regulations.” There must be “trophies on the wall” in
the form of conspicuous successful enforcement actions with meaningful
sanctions.
C. It Is Impossible to Regulate Away Wrongdoing
It is simply impossible for even the smartest, risk-based, algorithmendowed securities authority to regulate away all wrongdoing or eliminate
every instance of fraud and abuse before it begins. For example, corporate
financial and disclosure fraud is so sophisticated and complicated that it is
almost impossible to detect until after it has occurred. Not many investors,
or even market analysts, can verify a company’s financial statements and
conduct the extensive investigation required to ensure that the financial
statements and other disclosures by the company are complete, accurate, and
meet all the accounting standards. Few individuals fully understand the
details of, say, accounting standards that cover derivative transactions to a
degree that would ensure compliance, and few have access to the company’s
internal information to verify the transactions. Even fewer could do so if the
company’s officers lie to the accountants. Fraudsters are often sophisticated

51

Id.
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in disguising their wrongdoing, and, moreover, may have the complicity of
the gatekeeper accountants, bankers and/or lawyers.
The reality is that no one in a market-based society, including the
government, is in a position to second–guess the professionals in real time
and to double-check with the counterparties to every transaction to ensure the
accuracy of revenues, expenses, and other reported data. Nor could a system
operate efficiently under such constraints. Soaring transaction costs would
completely undermine any economic growth possibilities.52 Nonetheless,
with respect to financial reporting fraud at least, the truth eventually tends to
come out. When it does, a securities authority must have an enforcement
program that will not only address the immediate problem but also deter
others contemplating similar behavior.53 In a world where it is difficult to
detect wrongdoing, the importance of wrongdoers eventually having to pay a
high price for their misdeeds is paramount. Otherwise, fraud will have
positive expected returns, and, consequently, there will be excessive amounts
of fraud that will thoroughly undermine the market. Nothing sends a clear
message like a good, solid enforcement case.
V. BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE CAPITAL MARKETS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
Fraud destroys markets, destroys companies and destroys investors’
wealth. If investors cannot rely on the corporate disclosures, the integrity of
market-determined prices, and the basic honesty of market intermediaries,
then the entire system breaks down. The cost of capital will increase. The
good businesses will pull out of the market, and—to put it bluntly—the
market will be left with mostly liars and thieves.
A securities commission must be empowered with the necessary tools to
catch the wrongdoers and make them pay a price sufficient to deter the bulk
of market fraud. A relentless enforcement program underpins the entire
regulatory system by creating the deterrence that keeps the majority of
people following the rules. An effective enforcement program must both
produce the impression and the reality that these frauds and abuses are
52

See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008) (“[M]inimal ex ante interference enhances market
freedom and innovation: in return for regulating consequences, we gain novel products, new
businesses, competitive pricing, and employment opportunities, all generally unobstructed by
ex ante constraints.”).
53
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 48, at 1320 (“Ex post enforcement, on the other hand,
might be effectively employed to deter violations even in high-volume contexts through the
imposition of stiff penalties.”).
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routinely detected, relentlessly pursued, and dealt with effectively. The
second part of this Article outlines some of the best techniques available for
building an effective enforcement program, with emphasis on techniques that
are often lacking in many jurisdictions, yet offer the greatest potential return.
A. Step 1: Establish an Independent, Stand-Alone Enforcement Program
with a Mandate
1. An Enforcement Mandate
Securities authorities should establish a stand-alone civil enforcement
program that is vested with responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
all serious violations.54 Capital markets are dominated by powerful and
sophisticated persons who are entrusted with managing other peoples’ assets.
Consequently, the securities authority must have the authority, autonomy,
and resources not only to promulgate effective regulations that minimize
opportunities for abuse but also to take swift and effective enforcement
action against those who abuse the system.
An effective enforcement program should be designed to achieve the
following foundational goals:
●
●
●
●
●
●

Protect investors by bringing enforcement cases designed
to protect them from fraud and abuse;
Stop ongoing fraud via injunctive orders and asset freezes;
Deter illegal conduct by bringing enforcement actions
with demonstrable consequences for wrongdoing;
Disgorge illegal profits from violators;
Bar professionals from the industry if they have
committed fraud; and
Maintain confidence that the market is fair and honest.

A number of securities authorities do not have stand-alone enforcement
programs or have programs diluted with other responsibilities.

54
See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. SEC, The Benefits of
Enforcement Division, Remarks at the Brazilian Securities Comm’n 30th Anniv. Celebration
(Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch090506et.htm.
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2. Jurisdiction
The enforcement program must be vested with full statutory powers to
investigate, compel evidence from, and prosecute any person suspected of
violating the securities laws.55 Many regulatory authorities have capacity to
pursue only licensed or registered persons. These limited powers prevent
authorities from properly policing the full range of frauds that can undermine
their marketplace. Unlike the banking sector, securities law violations are
often committed by unregistered or unlicensed persons. To illustrate the
diversity of persons that may be the subject of a securities authority’s
enforcement portfolio, the U.S. SEC has brought enforcement actions against
a fifteen-year-old teenager,56 a retired seamstress grandmother in Croatia,57
the State of New Jersey,58 a chemist at the Food and Drug Administration,59 a
foreign regulator,60 and the owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team.61
Nearly 50% of the U.S. SEC’s actions are against non-registered persons and
entities.
3. Staffing
Investigating and prosecuting securities fraud requires leadership by
individuals who are relentless in investigating complaints, tips, referrals, and
55

See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(a)(1)–(b) (West 2011)
(“The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of
this chapter . . . .”).
56
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Brings Fraud Charges in Internet Manipulation Scheme (Sept.
20, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-135.txt (charging a teenager for
manipulating stock over the internet).
57
See Press Release, SEC, Court Freezes Additional Accounts Linked to Suspicious Trades
in Reebok (Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19340.htm
(naming Sonya Anticevic whose accounts were used to trade in Reebok securities).
58
See In re New Jersey, Release No. 9135, Aug. 18, 2010, Administrative Proceeding File
No. 3-14009, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/33-9135.pdf (charging the
State for fraudulent municipal bond offerings).
59
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges FDA Chemist with Insider Trading Ahead of Drug
Approval Announcement (Mar. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-76.htm.
60
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two Accountants and Antiguan Regulator for Roles in
Stanford Ponzi Scheme (June 19, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/20
09-140.htm (alleging the CEO of Antigua’s Financial Services Regulatory Commission
accepted bribes to ignore a Ponzi scheme).
61
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark Cuban (Nov.
17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20810.htm.
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cases and in prosecuting those who are responsible for wrongdoing. Those
same individuals must also possess a commitment to public service, the
professionalism and discretion to prioritize cases, and be guided by
principles of fairness and justice. Among others, investigative staff should
be comprised of lawyers, accountants, and former police investigators, who
are committed to aggressively rooting out wrongdoing and are trained in
gathering evidence and prosecuting cases. A primary advantage in having
both investigative and prosecutorial functions in the same department is that
the prosecutors will be readily available to provide guidance on the evidence
necessary to meet the legal elements of any potential prosecutions.
4. Independence
The enforcement program should also have the prosecutorial discretion to
open or close its own investigations at any time (subject to oversight) and not
have to wait on reports or referrals from other offices and departments before
using its own staff to request or compel information to further an investigation.
The enforcement program also should not have to cede prosecutorial authority
to another agency. Empowering one agency with both the responsibility and
accountability for this mission is the best assurance of success. As Napoleon
said, “[O]ne bad general is worth two good ones.”62
The enforcement program cannot be independent if the securities
authority itself is not operationally independent. A capital market regulator
should be structured by law as an independent regulatory and law
enforcement agency that is empowered with the discretion to regulate,
investigate, and bring enforcement proceedings to protect investors and to
keep the capital market clean and honest, all while free of political influence.
Securities authorities are often organized under a finance ministry or central
bank, which often retains authority to approve budgets, hiring, and even
proposed rules, regulations, and enforcement actions. The lack of selffunding nearly led to the shutdown of most SEC operations in early 2011.
This lack of independence typically results in an impediment to progress in a
securities market because the securities authority is unable to act swiftly and
decisively in response to ever-changing market conditions.
The
independence of securities regulators is one of the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles.63
62

WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE, LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 382 (1894).
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (IOSCO), OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 4 (2010) [hereinafter IOSCO], available at http://www.compliance-exchange.
63
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The securities authority should consist of officials who act through
majority vote and who sever their ties to the industry to avoid conflicts of
interest. Ensuring that final agency action, such as enforcement actions, are
authorized by a majority vote by the securities authority as an institutional
body, rather than by an individual officer or chairman, helps insulate staff
and officials and eliminates pressure points that render the securities
authority vulnerable to undue influence.
5. Accountability
Independence must, of course, be balanced with accountability to the
public and to the law. There must always be a higher authority. Typically,
securities authorities are subject to oversight by a legislative committee,
which is necessary and appropriate so long as it avoids undue political
influence over agency operational decision making. Proposed rules and
regulations should be published to provide the industry and the public a
formal comment period, and comments received should be considered by the
securities authority before finalizing regulations. All final actions and
decisions by the regulator, including enforcement actions, should be
transparent, public, and subject to judicial oversight and review. However,
judicial review should involve some deference to the expertise of the
securities authority, and the degree of deference should correlate to the
quality of the administrative and deliberative process at the agency level.
The securities law can prohibit courts from substituting their judgment for
that of the securities authority and from overturning the agency’s decisions in
absence of arbitrary application or abuse of discretion granted under the
securities law statute.64
6. Immunity for Staff
No employee or official of a securities authority should be exposed to
personal liability so long as he or she is acting within the scope of his or her
statutory responsibilities. Such exposure has the potential of significantly
limiting staff initiative and discouraging them from aggressively performing
investigations. This is of particular concern in cases where the subject(s)
com/governance/library/ioscoprinciples2010.pdf.
64
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (granting administrative deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute it
administers).
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under investigation for potential securities law violations might be wealthy,
powerful, or otherwise politically connected individuals who are in a position
to influence or stop an investigation by intimidation and threats of legal action.
There should also be a provision for the defense of staff accused of
wrongdoing or improper motives in discharging their official duties pending
a finding on the merits. Obviously, any such defense would not extend to
actions such as taking bribes, stealing, misusing confidential information,
and other actions taken outside the scope of their statutory responsibilities. If
the employee is exonerated, he or she should suffer no pecuniary or nonpecuniary impact.
The problem of threats and intimidation may be particularly complex and
compounded in smaller markets because the market participants and
regulators typically know each other. Market participants tend to be the
wealthy, powerful, and politically connected, and it is not uncommon for
them to use their position to achieve short-term gain at the unfair expense of
others.65 Governments must provide backing and cover for the courageous
individuals who seek to do public service and reform markets because it will
often mean having to go after the rich, entrenched, and powerful.
7. Ethics
A securities authority must set the standards that will serve to guide and,
where necessary change, corporate and market culture. This can occur only
if the securities authority and its staff are perceived as professionals that are
beyond reproach. The regulatory authority should be empowered to hire
staff that will carry out their public service duties in a fair, professional, and
impartial manner. The staff must be bound by a vigorous ethics program that
should be institutionalized and visible. A poster at the airport in Abuja,
Nigeria summed it up well: “Corruption Kills a Country.” The same can be

65

For example, Perfecto Yasay, Chairman of the Philippines SEC from 1995–2000,
courageously resisted pressure from the President of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada (who was
later impeached), to drop a market manipulation investigation involving one of the President’s
business associates. Wayne Arnold, Widening Breach Develops in Philippine Insider Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at C8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/business/inte
rnational-business-widening-breach-develops-in-philippine-insider-case.html?src=pm.
More
tragically, Andrei Kozlov, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank, who led the Central
Bank’s fight against corruption in the banking industry, was assassinated on September 13, 2006.
Helene Cooper, U.S. Releases Rights Report, with an Acknowledgement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2007, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/Washington/07diplo.html.
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said of the effects of corruption on a capital market.66 Since ethics is an area
that takes ongoing vigilance, every securities authority should have an
institutionalized ethics program that is available at all times to staff and
officials.67
B. Step 2: Build Capacity to Respond to Specific Securities Law Violations
The enforcement program should develop the in-house, standing capacity
and expertise to focus on the six primary categories of securities law
violations that are endemic to all capital markets:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Financial accounting fraud and disclosure violations by
stock issuing companies;
Insider trading;
Market manipulation;
Broker-dealer and investment advisor violations, (such as
front running, churning, unauthorized transactions,
commingling of assets, and compliance failures68);
Self-regulatory organization violations; and
Offering frauds like pyramid schemes, boiler rooms, and
other unauthorized securities offerings.69

Any one of these frauds and abuses, if left unchecked, has the potential to
undermine a capital market and do massive damage to investors.70 This
66

See generally Kroll, supra note 14 (outlining the effect of fraud and corruption on
international business decisions).
67
An example is the U.S. SEC’s ethics program. Office of the Ethics Counsel, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ethics.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
68
See, e.g., Sample Practices That Violate Regulations, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/QualificationsExams/ReglisteredReps/B
rochure/P009869 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (detailing the rules against such practices by
broker-dealers).
69
See, e.g., Investor Alerts, Avoiding Investment Scams, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/FraudsAndScams/P118010
(last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (describing the various types of investment offering fraud).
70
See, e.g., Bashar H. Malkawi & Haitham A. Haloush, Reflections on the Securities Law
of Jordan, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 763, 798 (2008) (“The offenses of insider trading and
market manipulation are the most detrimental to the creation of investor confidence in the
capital market.”). It is worth noting that in the U.S. there is one elegantly simple statute that is
the foundation for most SEC enforcement actions involving fraud. See Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf. A comparable sample statute would read:
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requires training for the enforcement staff on how to handle these cases.
Countries with larger markets may want to consider specialized units that
cultivate and maintain expertise in each of these areas.71 Three of these areas
are discussed in further detail below.
1. Financial Disclosure Fraud
Disclosure is the foundation of the capital market—it facilitates exchange,
honesty, confidence, growth, and development.72 The mission of securities
authorities is to protect investors and promote capital formation, and
disclosure is the tool that accomplishes both of these things.73 A securities
authority must ensure that issuing companies, and their auditors, accountants,
and other “gatekeepers,” are accountable to provide investors with complete,
accurate, and timely disclosures of all material information that a reasonable
investor would want to know before making an investment decision.74
Investors cannot properly assess and manage risk unless they are confident
that the information available regarding stock issuing companies is complete,

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the securities authority may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
71
The SEC, for example, has taken this approach in its post-Madoff Ponzi scheme reforms,
with specialized divisions for different types of fraud. See Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified
Oct. 8, 2010).
72
See Oren A. Amram, When Worlds Collide: Transfer Pricing Tax Strategies and the
Securities Laws, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 324, 332 (2008) (noting that the history of the U.S.
disclosure regime is grounded in aims “to achieve transparency in capital markets”); see also
Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5,906, 14 S.E.C. Docket 178
(Feb. 15, 1978) (“The basic objective of the disclosure requirements is to increase investor
confidence and to make the securities markets more efficient and as fair and honest as
possible.”).
73
See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “A
Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 80 (2006) (“[The SEC], in crafting the disclosures
[for a particular regulation] carefully and expertly strikes a balance between reasonable
protection of investors and capital formation.”).
74
Canada, for example, has a “gatekeeper” regime applicable to material disclosures by
“directors, lawyers, auditors, underwriters, credit rating agencies (CRAs), financial analysts,
and retail investment advisors (RIAs).” Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Corporate Gatekeeper Liability
in Canada, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 442 (2007).
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accurate, and timely.75 This means that investors must have access to both
good and bad material information about a company, its management, and its
financial statements.76
To illustrate the potential impact if a disclosure program is ineffective,
one may look to the financial reporting fraud crisis in the U.S. Enron
imploded in November 2001.77 The collapse of WorldCom followed in July
2002, which was characterized by accounting improprieties of unprecedented
magnitude and resulted in the largest corporate bankruptcy in history. 78 The
aggregate market value of the Wilshire 5,000 stock index is estimated to
have declined $8.7 trillion from March 2000 to October 2002,79 a market
capitalization loss of nearly 50%.80 The loss of jobs and losses to investors
were devastating to the U.S. economy and society.81 The lesson from this
analysis is that regulation and enforcement programs that are insufficient to
quickly address disclosure failures may have catastrophic results.
Conversely, a successful disclosure and enforcement regime may result in
doubling of market value!

75
See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear A Good Thing Is Coming to an End:
The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 729 (1999) (“The more
information investors have, the better able they are to make optimal investment choices.”).
76
Per the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, “[t]he term ‘material,’ when used to
qualify a requirement for furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011) (emphasis added) (implying that material information of both good
and bad effect must be provided to investors), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea
34.pdf.
77
Enron filed for bankruptcy in November 2001. See Douglas M. Branson, Enron–When
All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48
VILL. L. REV. 989, 1018 (2003).
78
See David Teather, Corporate America’s Path to a Very Public Humbling, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Dec. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 15182204 (“WorldCom . . . became the largest
ever bankruptcy in July [2002] after being discovered operating the largest alleged fraud.”).
79
Tom Walker, Market Mauling Now 41% Erased, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 2, 2003, at
D1, available at 2003 WLNR 6234154 (“At its worst point, investors had lost $8.7 trillion in
market value between March 24, 2000, when the Wilshire peaked, and Oct. 9, 2002.”).
80
The S&P Index declined over 45% from the high of March 2000 to June 2002. See Alex
Berenson, The Nation: Scream!; Hold on for a Wild Ride, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/weekinreview/21BERE.html.
81
Beth Piskora, Wall Street Anticipates a Week of Watching, N.Y. POST, Nov. 4, 2002, at
31, available at 2002 WLNR 12311057 (detailing the extreme loss of jobs and investor
uneasiness during the 2002 downturn in the U.S.).
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2. Insider Trading
Insider trading is unfair buying or selling of a company’s stock “while in
possession of material, non-public information” about the company or
stock.82 Many markets are characterized by pervasive insider trading, which
is unfortunate because it raises the cost of capital.83 However, in general,
there are comparatively few instances of successful prosecution of insider
trading outside the U.S.84 In contrast, the U.S. SEC successfully prosecutes
about fifty civil insider trading cases each year, which routinely result in the
defendants disgorging all of their profits (or losses avoided) and paying a
penalty “up to three times the amount of profit gained, or loss avoided.”85
This disparity may be attributable to the SEC’s use of non-criminal remedies
and powerful investigative tools, which will be discussed in more detail in
Step 4 below.
Insider trading is difficult to investigate and prosecute under both a civil
“preponderance of the evidence” or the criminal “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard.86 One of my colleagues had the idea of a strict liability
standard to address the difficulties in investigating and proving insider
trading cases. Under such a legal standard, gains (or losses avoided) by
insiders would be disgorged in circumstances where it was simply
demonstrated that the trader traded while in possession of inside
information.87 That is, no finding of intent to engage in wrongdoing would
be necessary.88 This approach involves a substantially reduced burden of
82
Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/in
sider.htm (last modified Apr. 19, 2001).
83
See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN.
75 (2002), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Teaching/BA453_2004/B
D_The_world.pdf (finding the “cost of equity is reduced by roughly 5% . . . if insider trading
regulations are enforced”).
84
Thomas C. Pearson, When Hedge Funds Betray a Creditor Committee’s Fiduciary Role:
New Twists on Insider Trading in the International Financial Markets, 28 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 165, 212 (2008) (noting the lack of international enforcement of securities laws,
including insider trading regulations).
85
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMM’N 4 (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf.
86
See Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573,
639–40.
87
See Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 239, 249–57, 278–85 (1999) (finding strong support for the “having possession”
standard in U.S. case law).
88
See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining the SEC’s argument
that simple knowing possession of insider information would carry liability).
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proof, albeit coupled with a light sanction in the form of simple
disgorgement, absent aggravating circumstances.89
Presumably, this
approach would result in more certain instances of “prosecution” of insider
trading, albeit with light penalties, which may be preferable to fewer
prosecutions albeit with heavy penalties. The bottom line is that securities
authorities should identify the most cost-effective approach to reducing the
incidence of insider trading by creating the perception and reality that insider
trading is not profitable.
3. Pyramid and Ponzi Schemes
A pyramid or Ponzi scheme arises any time new investor funds are used
to pay old investors.90 The pretense is that the returns are from a real
investment, when there have been no such returns and often no such
investment.91 Pyramid schemes are always and inevitably destined to
collapse, resulting in nearly complete losses to a vast majority of the
investors.92 They are frauds by definition.93 Pyramid schemes are most
often perpetrated by unregulated persons,94 but increasingly authorities must
be vigilant to ensure that regulated persons, particularly those facing
financial difficulties, are not operating pyramid schemes such as that
perpetrated by Bernard Madoff.
Numerous jurisdictions have had, and continue to have, their share of
problems with pyramid schemes. Pyramid schemes brought the government
of Albania to its knees in 1997;95 the MMM Investment scheme in Russia
lost $1.5 billion in the 1990s;96 unregistered fraudulent offerings (UFOs)
plagued Jamaica’s financial markets culminating in the Jamaica Financial
89
See id. at 1337–38 (finding that a law giving the SEC the right to receive treble damages
in a civil case for insider trading suggested the knowing possession standard was
inappropriate).
90
See Clarence L. Pozza, Jr. et al., A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff,
Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. BUS. SEC. L. 113, 116–17 (2010).
91
Id.
92
R. Alexander Pilmer & Mark T. Cramer, Swindler’s List, L.A. LAW., June 2009, at 22, 24
(“[T]he ultimate failure of a Ponzi Scheme is certain.”).
93
See Pozza et al., supra note 90, at 116.
94
See Sergio Pareja, Sales Gone Wild: Will the FTC’s Business Opportunity Rule Put an
End to Pyramid Marketing Schemes?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 87–88 (2008).
95
See Celestine Bohlen, In a Poor Land, a Classic Swindle Leaves Rage and Emptier
Pockets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at A5.
96
See William R. White, Note, Taming the Markets—The New Russian Securities Law and
the Protection of Shareholder Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 125, 141–42 (1998).
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Services Authority’s shut down of Olint Investment in 2006;97 Colombia
declared a state of emergency in 2008 after the collapse of a large Ponzi
scheme;98 Nigeria struggles with hundreds of “wonder banks”;99 and Bernard
Madoff managed to conduct a long running and enormously destructive
pyramid scheme in the United States.100 One would think that both
perpetrators and investors would have learned their lesson from the Madoff
matter, but the SEC has shut down nearly 100 Ponzi schemes since
Madoff.101 They can only be addressed through eternal vigilance and strong
enforcement.
The most important government response to any pyramid scheme is to
shut it down by injunctive orders and asset restraints as soon as it is
detected.102 Every day that a pyramid scheme is allowed to continue results
in more damage and losses to investors.
The issue often arises as to why a securities authority, as opposed to a
banking authority or criminal authorities, should be responsible for shutting
down pyramid schemes.103 Pyramid schemes are not just “deposit taking”
enterprises as they may purport to be.104 Many offer securities, at least
within the definition of security under U.S. law,105 typically in the form of an
“investment contract.”106 Since the SEC has jurisdiction to pursue fraud in
97

See Olint Boss Pleads Guilty, Sent to Prison in TCI, JAMAICAN OBSERVER, Sept. 24,
2010; Julian Richardson, Olin Anger, JAMAICAN OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 2010.
98
Carlos Fradique-Méndez, The Recent Evolution of Columbia’s Financial Market,
ASPATORE, Aug. 2009, at 4, available at 2009 WL 2511991.
99
Ismail Mudashir, Kaduna – Storm Over “Wonder Banks,” DAILY TR. (Nig.) (Sept. 6, 2010),
http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2271:kaduna-s
torm-over-wonder-banks&catid=24:star-feature&Itemid=208; Resurgence of “Wonder Banks,”
DAILY TR. (Nig.) (July 16, 2010), http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article &id=85:resurgence-of-wonder-banks&catid=17:editorial&Itemid=9.
100
Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (and a New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 951–58.
101
Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, My First 100 Days as Director of
Enforcement, Remarks Before the New York City Bar (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm (noting that over forty Ponzi scheme
investigations began during Mr. Khuzami’s first 100 days).
102
C.R. Bowles, Jr. et al., Dirty Rotten Scoundrels: Ponzi Schemes in Bankruptcy Cases,
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (Mar. 28, 2009).
103
Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 403–04 (2010).
104
See infra note 106.
105
See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011), Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (West 2011).
106
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (defining investment contract as a
security); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63–64 (1990) (crafting a four factor
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the purchase and sale of any security,107 the SEC has jurisdiction over
pyramid schemes,108 and has shut down hundreds of them in the last several
years. Securities authorities, central banks, and criminal authorities must
ensure that there are cooperative mechanisms in place to deal quickly and
effectively with pyramid schemes.109 If the securities authority is to assume
an increasing, or primary role, then it should evaluate whether it needs legal
amendments to broaden the definition of a “security.” It will also need the
investigative and prosecutorial tools described throughout this Article.
C. Step 3: Empower the Capital Market Authority with Comprehensive
Compulsory Investigative Authority
A modern capital market authority must have, and routinely use, full
compulsory authority to require production of any information, from any
person, that is relevant to conducting a complete and thorough
investigation.110 Investigators must have the tools to follow the facts
wherever they may lead.111 The essential importance of this broad
“family resemblance” test for determining whether a “note” is a security).
107
Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
108
Mark Frederick Hoffman, Note, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 28
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 682 (1995).
109
For another set of proffered reforms, see Barnard, supra note 103.
110
See generally 15 U.S.C. 78u(a)(1) (West 2011); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422
F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir. 1970). Model statutory language providing such authority could
read as follows:
The securities authority may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating,
or is about to violate any provision of the Securities Laws, the rules or
regulations thereunder. The securities authority is authorized in its
discretion, to investigate any facts, practices, or matters which it may deem
necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions, in the
prescribing of rules and regulations under this law, or in securing information
to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the
matters to which this law relates.
111
See generally Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21(b) (West 2011).
Model statutory language could read as follows:
For the purpose of any investigation, or any other proceeding under this law,
any member of the securities authority, or any officer designated by it, is
empowered to administer oaths, summon witnesses, take statements and other
testimonial evidence, and require the production of any books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda, or other records (whether paper or electronic)
which the securities authority deems relevant or material to the investigation
or proceeding.
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compulsory authority cannot be overstressed. Fraudsters manipulate markets
using their laptop computers. Insider traders pass information through email,
phone calls and text messages. Securities frauds often involve secreting
illegal proceeds through the banking system, often in accounts held by
corporations or trusts, necessitating routine access to bank records and other
beneficial ownership information. Even regulated persons, such as brokers
and their affiliates, use third parties and personal communication devices to
perpetrate their schemes. Witnesses’ testimony is also an essential
component of building the evidentiary record to successfully stop market
fraud. These are just a few examples of the wide range of information that
must be accessible by a modern securities authority through compulsory
process if they are to effectively police their market and protect investors.
Moreover, this authority must be backed up by criminal penalties for refusal
to produce evidence, destruction of or tampering with evidence, and for lying
to examiners and investigators.112
1. Why the Ability to Obtain Bank Records Is Essential for Securities
Authorities
Securities fraud is always motivated by money. Routine access to bank
records is essential to successfully pursue market manipulation and insider
trading cases because the movement of money through bank accounts is a
primary source of evidence connecting parties to a fraudulent scheme, as
well as to each other. The ability to easily obtain bank records is a core
international standard, recognized in the IOSCO Principles,113 and is a
requirement of the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding

112
See generally id. § 78u(c) (providing for criminal penalties for refusal to obey an SEC
subpoena for documents or testimony). Statutory language providing for such penalties could
read substantially similar to the following:
In case of refusal to obey a securities authority summons issued to any
person, the securities authority may invoke the aid of the appropriate court or
tribunal to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of books, papers, correspondence, and other records. Such court
or tribunal may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the
securities authority or any member or officer designated by the securities
authority, to produce records or to give statements or testimony relating to the
matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may
be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
113
IOSCO, supra note 63, at 6.
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(MMOU).114 The U.S. SEC routinely seeks bank records in its securities
fraud investigations.
Securities authorities must set up strict guidelines for its staff as to how to
request and handle bank records. The request must be made in the course of
a legitimate investigation and the information must be held confidential.115
Misuse of bank records and other non-public information by staff or officials
should be an offense punishable by termination and/or prosecution. This
being said, the securities authority should resist any effort requiring
permission of a court or of the banking authorities before obtaining bank
records. If every routine request for bank records required a judicial hearing,
the resulting delay often would be prejudicial to an investigation. Similarly,
requiring approval from the banking authorities would diminish the
independence of the securities authorities and would allow the banking
authorities to exert potentially inappropriate influence over securities
investigations.
a. A Note on Customer Notification
Securities authorities seek bank records in investigations because the staff
is trying to determine whether the account holder has committed securities
fraud or whether the proceeds are in an account that they control. Some
securities authorities have anti-tipping provisions, as do most financial
intelligence units.116 Unfortunately, in the U.S. the Right to Financial
Privacy Act (RFPA) mandates that the SEC give notice to the customer and
an opportunity to object (which objection is rarely successful).117 This notice
carries the danger that it will tip off a fraudster that an SEC investigation is
ongoing, often sooner than the staff would prefer to surface in an
114

Int’l Org. of Sec. Commissions (IOSCO), Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding,
art. 7(b)(ii) (May 2002) [hereinafter IOSCO MMOU], available at http://www.iosco.org/libra
ry/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd126.pdf.
115
For example, the U.S. SEC uses standard forms that are provided to every witness
requested or compelled to provide information. These forms explain the rights of the parties
and the routine uses to which the information provided may be used, including use in
enforcement actions or in cooperation with domestic or foreign authorities.
See
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR PERSONS REQUESTED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION
VOLUNTARILY OR DIRECTED TO SUPPLY INFORMATION PURSUANT TO A COMMISSION SUBPOENA
(FORM 1662) (Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sec1662.pdf.
116
See Financial Action Task Force, FAFT 40 Recommendations, at 5 (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF.
117
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3404 (West 2011) [hereinafter
RFPA], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/priv.pdf.
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investigation. If staff is investigating someone for financial fraud, the last
thing they want to do is to notify the person that they are seeking bank
records before having a chance to look at those records to determine whether
the person has other accounts that may be used to hide the proceeds of fraud.
Laws like the RFPA that require law enforcement authorities investigating
financial fraud to provide customer notice and an opportunity to protest
access to their financial records are an unnecessary and inappropriate
impediment to law enforcement.118 As one of my colleagues so eloquently
put the issue:
While privacy concerns are of profound significance and must
be accorded their proper sway, nonetheless so too is it also of
profound social significance that fraudsters do not dominate the
capital markets, destroy other people’s hard earned wealth and,
indeed, reduce the level of economic growth through their
malfeasance and thievery.119
Foreign authorities should fight hard for anti-tipping provisions to ensure
that they may conduct and complete their investigations without undue
interference or delay.
2. Why Access to Telephone Records, Emails, Internet Service Provider
Records, and Other Forms of Electronic Communications Are Essential for
Securities Authorities
Securities authorities must have the authority to compel production of
telephone records if they want to adequately police insider trading and
market manipulation. These records can establish whether two parties knew
each other and had conversations at key times during an event relevant to the
investigation.120 This is typically the key evidence necessary to prove insider

118
While there is a provision in the RFPA that a court order may be sought for a temporary
exemption from the notice requirement, id. § 3409, it creates substantial delay and burden to
require investigatory staff in the heat of juggling multiple investigations to go to court to
complete their investigations.
119
Dr. Robert M. Fisher, Deputy Dir., Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. SEC.
120
Telephone records are not transcripts of telephone conversations. Rather, these are
records that show the date and time telephone calls are placed; the numbers called; the
duration of the calls; and subscriber information, such as the name, address, and payment
information of the owner of the telephone number.
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trading and market manipulation cases.121 The U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that “[t]he temporal proximity of a phone conversation
between the trader and one with insider knowledge provides a reasonable
basis for inferring that the basis of the trader’s belief was the inside
information.”122 I estimate that phone records are relied on in well over half
of SEC’s successful insider trading prosecutions. As a corollary, I would
assume that the inability to obtain phone records probably reduces a
securities authority’s ability to investigate successfully and prosecute insider
trading by at least half.
Securities authorities must also have the authority to obtain emails, hard
drives, and ISP records. With the ever-increasing use of electronic
communications and web-based marketing and information distribution
tools, the ability to obtain email communications and ISP records, which can
provide the name, address, and billing information for subscribers to email
accounts or web pages, is increasingly important for effective securities
investigations. This is most recently illustrated by the U.S. SEC enforcement
action against two Canadians who used Facebook, Twitter, and their website
to allegedly manipulate stocks.123 Accordingly, as with telephone records,
securities commissions should actively pursue the statutory authority to
obtain email, ISP records, and other electronic communications.
3. Why Compulsory Witness Statements?
Witness statements play a critical role in an investigation. Securities
authorities must have the authority to compel witnesses, including nonregulated persons, to appear and testify before their staff in the course of an
investigation. There must also be consequences for lying to the staff.124

121
L. HILTON FOSTER, INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2000) (“Telephone records
frequently provide this circumstantial evidence in ‘tipping’ cases.”), available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/foster.pdf.
122
SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2004).
123
See Press Release, SEC, Court Enters Default Judgments of Permanent Injunction and
Other Relief Against Defendants Carol McKeown, Daniel F. Ryan and Their Companies
Downshire Capital Inc. and Meadow Vista Financial Corp. (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21847.htm.
124
See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Teresa Fernandez Sentenced to 41 Months in Prison for
Making False Statements to the SEC and Probation Officers (Jan. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19545.htm.
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D. Step 4: Empower the Securities Authority with Efficient, Effective, and
Flexible Civil Remedies
A capital market’s regulator should be empowered with a broad range of
remedies at its disposal that are designed to protect investors, deter illegal
conduct, and remediate market abuses. A broad range of remedies enables a
regulator to tailor each specific remedy to the particular abuse that is being
addressed.
A number of countries have attempted to build up a criminal response to
market frauds at the expense of civil enforcement programs. This is the
wrong approach and unsustainable. The criminal process is not well suited
to take the lead role in dealing with most securities law violations.
Prosecutors are busy and securities cases are complex. The criminal process
takes enormous resources, and the conviction rate for securities fraud all over
the world is very low because the criminal burden of proof—beyond a
reasonable doubt—is difficult to meet.125 Criminal cases, and the moral
stigma they represent, should be reserved for the most egregious cases—the
premeditated frauds that result in the destruction of life savings and that
involve market-destroying conduct. Where this line is drawn in any
particular case will depend on many factors, but, in my view, no more than
10% of securities law violations in a market need be dealt with criminally.126
In contrast, civil tools are much more flexible, efficient, certain, and
effective at stopping and remedying securities fraud and market abuse.127 A
125
See, e.g., Regina F. Burch, “Unfit to Serve” Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1085
(2008) (“[U.S.] [f]ederal criminal trials for violations of federal securities laws are lengthy,
involve large resource expenditures by government prosecutors, require sifting through
thousands of pages of corporate documents, and involve many corporate employees and other
individuals. [The government] must show that the defendant acted willfully or knowingly and
must establish its case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
126
For example, in many jurisdictions, insider trading can only be prosecuted criminally,
which means that the securities authority refers the matter to criminal authorities for
prosecution. Now, while insider trading is always bad for markets, there is a long continuum
of behavior involved. For example, a CEO may reveal inside information to his barber while
getting a haircut; the barber just cannot resist the good fortune that has fallen into his lap, and
he goes out and trades. On the other hand, there are the investment bankers working on
mergers deals who are sworn to secrecy and sign agreements not to trade, yet they abuse their
professional positions by secretly trading through overseas accounts held by nominee-owned
corporations that they secretly control. In my view, criminal resources are best spent on the
latter situation.
127
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contains a remarkably flexible provision
that says that “the [SEC] may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(5) (West
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comprehensive range of remedies includes: trading suspensions,
disgorgement of illegal profits, officer and director bars, civil monetary
penalties, injunctive orders to stop present and future violations, appointment
of a corporate monitor or receiver, and asset freezes. These remedies can be
mixed, matched, and tailored to neatly fit the specific violation. Civil
injunctive actions can also be backed by the court’s authority to enforce its
orders, including incarceration for contempt, ensuring that these orders have
teeth.128
Moreover, the prophylactic and deterrent effect of public exposure of
wrongdoing should not be underestimated, particularly in an industry that
thrives on reputation. Indeed, this is a leverage point that the securities
authority should fully exploit. Enforcement actions should serve as a forum
to send a message by exposing the wrongdoer and explaining the nature of
the violation, the harm caused, and the remedial action being taken to correct
the problem to protect investors and the market.
The U.S. has developed what is characterized as a “parallel” system,
whereby the SEC can prosecute a case civilly without precluding a parallel
criminal case by the Department of Justice for the same conduct.129 Many
have questioned why this parallel system does not result in a constitutional
double jeopardy violation. However, the system has survived judicial
scrutiny because the agency’s penalties and other relief are designed to be
remedial in nature, and not punishment for double jeopardy purposes.130

2011).
128
See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Sec Files Second Contempt Motion Against Roc Hatfield
and Global Diamond Fund, Inc. (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/li
treleases/lr17747.htm (describing the SEC’s contempt action for failure to file a sworn
accounting that had been ordered by the judge).
129
See Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, and Ira L. Brandriss, Staff
Attorney, Div. of Enforcement, SEC, The Advantages of a Dual System: Parallel Streams of
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, Remarks at the 16th
International Symposium on Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998) (remarking on the advantages
offered by the U.S. system of both civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch222.htm.
130
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 105 (1997) (holding that the federal government’s
administrative proceedings imposing monetary penalties against petitioners for violations of
banking statutes did not bar the subsequent criminal proceedings for the same conduct because
the administrative proceedings were civil actions for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause).
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1. Disgorging Illegal Proceeds of Securities Fraud: Show Me the Money!
Securities frauds are financial crimes and, as such, are all about the
money. Securities frauds are particularly tempting because people can
quickly make millions of dollars with well-timed insider trading, by
participating in a scheme to pump up stock prices while secretly selling into
the hype, or by looting their company through undisclosed deals with
secretly controlled companies. Indeed, numerous SEC enforcement actions
involve securities fraudsters who have funded their “lavish lifestyles” with
ill-gotten investors’ funds.131 The temptation is high, the opportunities
abound, and the payoff is large. Securities authorities must be empowered to
remove these profits or the frauds will continue.
Remedies that focus on removing the profit incentive through
disgorgement and penalties are extremely effective in reducing and deterring
financial crime.132 If we could disgorge all proceeds of securities fraud, we
would eliminate fraud and misconduct from our markets. Confiscation of all
profits made from financial crime should be certain, automatic, and the
minimum sanction available.
Under no circumstances should an individual be permitted to keep the
proceeds of his securities law violation. Examples of disgorgement in the
context of various securities frauds would include:
●
●
●
●
●

Financial Fraud: officer’s bonus, stock options, salaries
where
company
financial
results
have
been
misrepresented, and trading profits;
Offering Fraud: money misappropriated from the investor
funds raised;
Broker Dealer Fraud: commissions earned on fraudulent
transactions;
Insider Trading: profits made or losses avoided from
insider trading; and
Manipulation: profits from manipulative trading and sales.

131
Search SEC Documents, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/search/se
arch.htm (search “lavish lifestyle”) (last modified July 30, 2009).
132
See Rules on Fair Fund and Disgorgement Plans, 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2006), available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/rulesprac2006.pdf (stating SEC disgorgement rules relating to
enforcement actions).
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2. Penalties
Penalties are defined as the fines assessed above and beyond the profits
made by the wrongdoer.133 If all the profits from market abuse and fraud
were disgorged in every instance of fraud, the incentive for such fraud and
abuse would be eliminated. It is because we cannot detect and prosecute
every instance of fraud and abuse that we need penalties in addition to
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to serve as a deterrent. Penalties should
have some meaningful correlation to the amount of the gain made from the
fraud and should be adjusted based on other factors, such as the harm to the
market, harm to investors, willfulness of the fraud, recidivism, the need to
create additional deterrence for the particular conduct, and other traditional
factors for assessing penalties. For example, if a person makes $1 million
from insider trading, and there is a one in four chance of catching that
person, then the penalty to achieve optimal deterrence (i.e., to ensure that
wrongdoing does not “pay” on average) should be $3 million, for a total
payment (disgorgement and penalty) of $4 million. Countries should be
careful about laws that provide a fixed amount of penalties for certain
violations, as the specified amount can quickly become obsolete and
represent a mere cost of business for the fraudster.
E. Step 5: Securities Authorities Need to Develop a Partnership with
Criminal Authorities
While I have argued that the vast majority of securities law violations can
and should be handled by a non-criminal process, there are always some
securities frauds that are so damaging to innocent investors’ lives, so
destructive to the market, and so calculated to steal from others, that the
perpetrators should go to jail. Securities law violations may also be
associated with other crimes, such as money laundering, mail fraud, wire
fraud, and conspiracy. This means the securities authority should develop a
good working relationship with the Attorney General or other criminal
authority to help ensure that the most egregious securities law violations are
prosecuted.134
133
See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20
06-4.htm (explaining the SEC’s position concerning financial penalties).
134
See Newkirk & Brandriss, supra note 129 (discussing best practices in coordinating
between civil and criminal authorities).
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F. Step 6: Securities Authorities Must Have Tools to Engage in Real-Time
Enforcement
It is not uncommon for a securities authority to learn of ongoing frauds
that, if not shut down immediately, can do irreparable harm to investors and
the market. These emergency situations can be expected to constitute 3% to
5% of a securities authority’s case load, if the U.S. SEC’s experience is any
guide.135 The point is that securities frauds will happen, and the earlier in
their life cycle they can be detected and stopped, the less damage they will
do. The lesson is that the securities authority should have the tools, the
standing authority, and the capacity to address these emergency situations as
they arise.
Some of the more effective emergency tools include injunctive orders,136
asset freezes, orders preventing destructions of documents, “accountings,”137
expedited discovery, repatriation orders, and surrender of passports.138 This
also means that when issuing companies fall below their disclosure or listing
standards the trading in their stocks may need to cease until they clarify their
disclosures. When brokerage firms fall below capital requirements, they
need to be addressed and resolved immediately. Leaving insolvent firms
open creates an environment that is extremely likely to produce fraud and
Ponzi scheme activity as the firm desperately searches for assets to fill, or
hide, their capital deficiencies. Insolvent firms that are allowed to continue
135

See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 31 (2010) (noting 3.26% of all enforcement investigations are deemed “high
impact”), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf#mda.
136
See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf. Legislation providing for injunctive
orders could read substantially similar to the following:
Whenever it shall appear to the securities authority that any person is
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of
any provision of the securities laws or regulations thereunder, it may in its
discretion bring an action in the appropriate court or tribunal to enjoin such
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted.
137
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 18 (9th ed. 2009) (noting that an “accounting” typically
involves an order to produce books and records, sworn financial statements, and the location
of assets).
138
For an example of the powerful remedies available in a temporary restraining order, see,
e.g., Press Release, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission Obtains Emergency Asset
Freeze Against Additional Defendants Who Purchased Call Options for TXU Corp. Stock
Prior to Acquisition Announcement (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigatio
n/litreleases/2007/lr20063.htm.
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almost invariably lead to trouble, and, in general, should be cleared out of the
market.
1. Asset Freezes
When a fraud is in progress, it is often essential to get a freeze over all the
defendant’s assets “wherever they may be located” before the fraudster
learns of the investigation. Otherwise the first thing he tends to do is
dissipate his assets. To understand the urgency, stocks typically settle in
three days, which means that after three days the fraudster can wire the
proceeds to overseas bank accounts in the name of nominee owners, or the
proceeds will be used to buy diamonds, mansions, cars, or other items to fuel
their “lavish lifestyle.”139 For these situations, the securities authorities must
have a means to freeze assets before they are dissipated.
In the U.S., the SEC must get a court order before it can freeze assets on
an emergency basis (often without notice to the owner of the assets). The
court will issue the order if the SEC can establish a prima facie140 case and a
strong likelihood that it will prevail at trial on the merits of the case. The
SEC must also establish that the defendant, directly or indirectly, has
engaged in and, unless restrained and enjoined by an order of the court, will
continue to engage in acts, practices, and courses of business constituting
violations of the securities laws.141 Should the SEC meet this standard, the
court will impose a temporary freeze lasting ten days.142 Prior to the
expiration of the ten days, the court will hold a second hearing to determine
whether it should maintain the freeze for the duration of the litigation. The
SEC must give notice of this hearing to the owner of the assets, who can
appear and challenge the freeze order. Unless the owner of the assets can
persuade the court that the SEC is not likely to succeed on the merits, or that
the frozen assets are not a reasonable approximation of the proceeds of the
alleged fraud, the court will issue an order continuing the freeze until after a
139

Search SEC Documents, supra note 131.
Prima facie is Latin for “on its face.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (9th ed.
2009). A prima facie case is one that at first glance presents sufficient evidence for the
plaintiff to win. Id.
141
SEC v. Cavanagh, 155 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1998). These circumstances could include:
likely and significant dissipation or conversion of assets, significant harm to investors, flight
from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence, transfer of assets or records
outside the country, or other immediate and substantial harm to the public interest.
142
Id. (“An asset freeze requires a lesser showing; the SEC must establish only that is likely
to succeed on the merits.”).
140
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trial.143 Once the funds are wired out of the country, or otherwise dissipated,
they are difficult to recover. Seizing the proceeds of fraud provides
tremendous leverage over the defendants in financial crimes cases and will
be a key component in a securities authority’s ability to protect investors and
the market from securities fraud and abuse.
2. Financial Intelligence Units
Proceeds of securities fraud can be wired around the world at the click of
a mouse. Tracing such proceeds through traditional evidence-gathering
mechanisms, such as memorandum of understanding and mutual legal
assistance treaties, may take six months to obtain the records, only to find
that the funds had already been wired off to the next offshore jurisdiction
five months earlier. This is no way to conduct investigations in today’s
world. Securities fraud is a predicate offense to money laundering, which
means that any time the proceeds of securities fraud are being secreted away
through the banking system there is a potential money laundering offense.144
Increasingly, it makes sense for securities authorities to seek assistance
from financial intelligence units.145 Many financial intelligence units (FIUs)
have the capacity to quickly:
●
●
●
●

identify the beneficial ownership of accounts at issue;
determine whether the funds are still in the account;
work with financial institutions to conduct surveillance
over accounts and notify appropriate authorities of
customer attempts to withdraw or remove such funds; and
determine the disposition or destination of any funds that
have been withdrawn, wired, or moved.146

143
See SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that an asset freeze was
reasonable because of the high risk that funds would be further depleted without the freeze);
SEC v. ETS Payphones, 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the SEC’s
approximation of defendant’s “ill-gotten gains” were reasonable and so the freeze could
continue).
144
See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Opening Remarks at Joint Regulatory AntiMoney Laundering Training (Apr. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2008/spch042308klc.htm.
145
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS (2004), available at http://
www.apgml.org/issues/docs/19/fiu%20handbook_english.pdf (explaining FIUs and their
function in market regulation).
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A number of financial intelligence units also have the capacity to assist
with obtaining asset restraints either prior to or concurrently with an
imminent emergency enforcement action.147 FIUs have assisted the U.S.
SEC in securing millions of dollars in proceeds of fraud located in overseas
accounts. Securities authorities and FIUs must continue to develop their
capacity to work with each other.
G. Step 7: Securities Authorities Should Have the Ability to Settle Cases
Settlements are a valuable tool for building an enforcement program, but
only in a system where the regulator has sufficient authority to conduct
thorough investigations and apply meaningful sanctions against the
wrongdoers, and where it has the reputation for having the will, resources,
and skill to successfully prosecute the matter if it is not settled. Specifically,
wrongdoers must believe that if they do not settle, the securities authority is
ready and willing to prosecute an enforcement action against them and that it
will likely be successful in such proceedings.
Some authorities have expressed distaste for settlements, arguing that
they represent a compromise of justice. However, if properly structured,
settlements can achieve all the goals of an enforcement program.
Enforcement cases should not be settled unless the terms result in meaningful
relief that is sufficient to remedy the particular violation, protect investors,
and have a deterrent effect. Settlements must also result in penalties and
other relief that is closely comparable to those that would be obtained if the
case were litigated. The bottom line is that, if a settlement does not result in
the fundamental enforcement goals of deterrence, disgorgement, investor
protection, industry bars, prevention of ongoing fraud, and improvement of
investor confidence, then a settlement is counterproductive and should not be
accepted.
The settlement process should ensure that settlements result in recourse
by the securities authority if the defendant breaches the terms. In the U.S.,
settlements result in a consented court order, and breaches amount to
contempt of the court’s order, ensuring that settlements have “teeth.” It
should be noted here that the higher the quality of the investigation, the
higher the quality of the settlement, and the better the securities authority can
deter wrongful conduct and protect investors and the market. A properly
146
147

See generally id. (outlining the role of FIUs).
Id. at 14.
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structured settlement process can be fair and accountable, while allowing the
securities regulator to take action against the individual or entity, get its
message out to the public in a meaningful away, and collect penalties and
fines, while saving valuable public resources in the time and money it would
take to litigate a case to full completion in the courts.
The process should allow settlement negotiations at various times in the
investigation process, with appropriate safeguards to ensure that undue
pressure is not exerted to extract fines where a violation could not otherwise
be proven in court. Most serious settlement discussions should not occur
until late in the investigative process, ideally after the investigation is
complete and a preliminary determination has been made about the nature of
the violations. This will ensure that settlements are comprehensive and that
the full evidentiary record and corresponding violations are fully considered
in reaching the appropriate settlement. Negotiated settlements should be
considered and approved or rejected by the securities authority as an
institutional body, rather than by an individual officer. Lastly, final
settlement agreements must be transparent and public.
H. Step 8: Capital Markets Must Have Recourse to an Effective Judiciary
An effective modern financial market must have swift resolution of
disputes and regulatory enforcement actions, including the ability to grant
emergency relief to stop ongoing securities frauds. Capital locked up in
disputes is not available to grow an economy. This means that the securities
authority, and other capital market operators, must have recourse to an
effective judiciary to ensure that disputes are resolved quickly and
effectively to help unleash a modern capital market.148
1. Specialized Tribunals
The establishment of a specialized tribunal appears to be an attractive
option that should be considered by many capital markets. Traditional court
systems all too often do not offer a sufficiently timely and efficient
adjudication mechanism by which the securities authorities, or the securities
industry, can seek recourse for final resolution of disputes or enforcement
matters. Ideally, the tribunal should be empowered to hear not only appeals
148
The U.S. SEC uses independent administrative law judges to hear over 50% of its
enforcement cases. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/alj.shtml (last modified Apr. 19, 2010) (describing the role of that office).
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from administrative actions and orders by the securities authority but also
enforcement actions filed by the authority in the first instance. Preferably,
the tribunal would have capacity to issue binding injunctive orders, freeze
assets, issue industry bars, order accountings, and order production of
documents and testimony. To grow the market and establish confidence, the
securities authority must have a tribunal available to it that has capacity to
remedy the variety of abuses that it will inevitably face as the market grows
and develops, including prosecutions for insider trading, market
manipulation, financial accounting and disclosure violations by issuing
companies, abuse of customers by broker dealers and investment advisors,
and pyramid schemes. Indeed, countries should consider a specialized
tribunal that would have original jurisdiction to hear all capital marketsrelated matters, including disputes among investors and brokers and
disciplinary matters relating to the Exchange, as well as have jurisdiction to
hear securities authority enforcement proceedings. This may be particularly
important given the studies that suggest that private enforcement is also a
key element in market development.149
There are a number of models already being employed in various
countries, and those appear to be working well. Specialized tribunals are
efficient and can be set up to resolve cases in well under a year. The
expenses of establishing a specialized tribunal are likely far outweighed in
many markets by the potential dividends toward capital market development.
I. Step 9: Securities Authorities Must Have a Robust Compliance and
Inspection Program
The securities authority’s examination and inspection program should
work to reduce the incidence of customer abuse by market intermediaries
before they become serious violations. Programs for the inspection of
broker-dealers, investment advisors, and other regulated persons should be
separated from the enforcement program. Inspections are a non-adversarial
cooperative dialogue with the industry that typically result in nonpublic
deficiency letters;150 whereas an enforcement program is adversarial,
149

See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (2008) (exploring the regulation of self-dealing on market development, primarily
through private enforcement mechanisms to prevent diversion of corporate wealth from
investors to management).
150
A deficiency letter is provided by the regulator to the firm and identifies the problems, asks
the registrant to take remedial steps, and requests that the registrant provide a written response.
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compulsory and results in public enforcement actions. This “good cop —
bad cop” system has numerous advantages that mutually reinforce each
other.
A securities regulator should have a competent staff of examiners that are
well-trained to perform complete, comprehensive, and discreet examinations
of all market participants. Unlike many other functions of the regulator, the
examinations of market participants, and resulting examination reports,
should be confidential. Problems and deficiencies identified within firms
should be handled informally where possible, but securities examiners
should have authority to and not hesitate to refer the most serious securities
law violations found during examinations to enforcement staff where
appropriate.
1. Compliance Programs
One powerful way a securities authority can cultivate a culture of
compliance is to mandate an industry compliance program that requires firms
to establish a Chief Compliance Officer, compliance policies and procedures,
an annual self-assessment, access for the Chief Compliance Officer to the
firm’s senior-level executives, and internal codes of ethics.151 The regulator
can build a hierarchy whereby the individual firms are responsible for their
own representatives, the self-regulatory organizations are responsible for
their own firms, and the regulator oversees the entire structure. Such a
regime can be strongly reinforced by an enforcement program. For example,
a securities authority may sanction not only individual representatives for
recommending unsuitable investments, but also the employing firms for
failure to supervise their employees. “Failure to supervise” cases send a
strong message to the firms that they are responsible for having effective
compliance programs that will avoid, deter, and detect improprieties by their
employees and that they will be held accountable for deficiencies in such
programs. One solid enforcement case against a brokerage firm for a
compliance failure, or “failure to supervise,” will send a message to every
other firm in the market that, if the firm allows such conduct to happen on its
watch, it will be held accountable. Notably, an affirmative defense in these
See EXAMINATIONS BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE
INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N 24 (2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocieoverview.pdf (describing its examination process).
151
For an excellent article by the architect of such a program, see John H. Walsh,
Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381 (2008).
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cases is having a compliance program that is reasonably designed to detect
and remedy the wrongdoing. This serves to empower compliance officers, as
well as examiners, with the clout they need to insist on changes in a firm’s
conduct, culture, and procedure.
Morality has been defined as what a person does when nobody else is
looking. While a majority of people do not seek to unfairly profit at the
expense of others, there will always be a minority that will abuse the system.
The challenge for a securities authority is to create a transparent environment
where the perception is that everyone is looking—compliance officers,
investors, regulatory authorities, examiners, lawyers, accountants, and other
gatekeepers.
J. Step 10: Securities Authorities Must Develop a Partnership with the
Industry: The Self-Regulatory Model and Other Incentives to Cooperate with
the Government
Unfortunately, numerous securities authorities have not established an
effective partnership with their industry for sharing the burden associated
with monitoring, compliance, supervision, and disciplinary actions. The
government’s role is to ensure that the private sector thrives, and the private
sector should have every incentive to partner with the government in taking
the necessary steps toward this goal. Those in the private sector that are
taking the long-term view will support a fully empowered securities
authority with a vigorous enforcement program for this is no threat to
legitimate business. On the contrary, it is designed to protect and grow the
markets. The securities authority should watch for every opportunity to
leverage the resources and self-interest of the industry to the maximum
extent possible to be a partner in policing the securities market. The
regulatory structure should be characterized by a working partnership with
the industry at every level possible, albeit at “arms length” to avoid
“regulatory capture.”
1. Self-Regulatory Organization Structure
Self-regulatory structures are highly efficient and work well where the
regulator has full authority to require the industry to police its own members,
conduct surveillance, and report and remedy fraud and abuse. Selfregulatory organizations (SROs) are well-positioned to assume this role
because they are able to exercise “contractual” control over their
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membership. Requiring the industry to police itself also conserves
substantial public resources. The SRO’s ability to revoke membership is an
extraordinarily effective, albeit non-governmental tool that provides leverage
for ensuring that members follow the rules. Remarkably, in the U.S., SROs
conduct about twice as many examinations and enforcement actions as the
SEC. Absent this division of labor, the SEC would likely need to triple its
staff and budget. This approach takes a huge burden off of the public
resources of a securities authority and frees it up to assume a more
appropriate role as an “APEX” regulator. Delegated authority, however, also
must come with responsibility and accountability. Moreover, if the SRO
does not adequately carry out its responsibilities, the securities authority
must use its enforcement powers to correct the situation.152 As they say:
“trust, but verify.”
Securities regulators may also seek to cultivate a culture of cooperation
within the industry. Again, this is often accomplished by appealing to the
industry’s self-interest. The securities authority may want to consider
implementing a package of incentives to regulated persons for self-policing,
self-remediating, and cooperating with investigations. This program can
include both intermediaries and stock-issuing companies, as well as
whistleblowers and others that come forward with actionable information.153
Simply put, if a regulated person or other “gatekeeper” cooperates with an
investigation they may be provided with corresponding favorable treatment
in the form of lower penalties in any enforcement cases that the securities
authority may ultimately bring. Likewise, failure to cooperate may result in
correspondingly higher penalties and other sanctions. Industry cooperation
with inspections and investigations can substantially improve the
responsiveness and capacity of the securities authority’s enforcement
program. All credit for cooperation should be transparent and approved by
152
See, e.g., Sodano, Case No. 3-12596 (SEC Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55509-o.pdf (discussing charges against CEO of American Stock
Exchange for inadequate surveillance, investigatory, enforcement, and compliance programs).
153
The U.S. SEC has published a list of considerations to help educate the industry about the
benefits of cooperating, and the corresponding penalties for lack of cooperation. See Report
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) & the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. This program has worked well and
companies coming forward to self-report problems in their organization is a significant source
of enforcement cases. See also Enforcement Cooperation Initiative, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml (last modified
Nov. 2, 2011) (describing a series of measures to encourage cooperation by both individuals
and companies with SEC investigations and enforcement actions).
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the securities authority as an institutional body to ensure consistency with
programmatic goals and avoid unfair preferential treatment.
K. Step 11: The Securities Authority Must Maximize Its Capacity to Engage
in International Cooperation
With the globalization of capital markets, securities authorities must have
capacity to work with international regulatory and law enforcement partners
to protect their market and investors, and to provide reciprocal assistance
when requested. The capacity of a securities authority to protect its market is
increasingly dependent on the quality of regulatory authorities in other
markets. Securities fraud and abuse is not constrained by geographic
borders, but the authority of a securities authority ends at the border. Market
abuses that damage investors can originate from anywhere in the world, and
domestic market abuses often involve the proceeds of the scheme being
wired outside of the country. International boiler rooms154 and pyramid
schemes are examples that further illustrate this point. These international
frauds involve unscrupulous salesmen that sell securities from one
jurisdiction, often where there is lax enforcement. They sell securities from
companies from a second jurisdiction. The victims are in a third set of
jurisdictions, who wire their funds to offshore accounts in a fourth set of
jurisdictions, and the whole scheme is masterminded by fraudsters who could
be located anywhere. Unsuspecting investors, often vulnerable and elderly,
are devastated daily by these frauds. These are truly international schemes
designed to exploit the jurisdictional limitations of law enforcement that will
require new international techniques and cooperation.
The IOSCO MMOU is a magnificent achievement in international
enforcement cooperation. The MMOU provides a standardized framework
for sharing enforcement-related information and a gradually expanding
network of participating regulatory agencies.155 Approximately eighty
countries are now signatories,156 many after working to obtain the legislative
154
See generally Boiler Room, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answe
rs/boiler.htm (last modified May 25, 2000) (describing boiler room frauds).
155
See Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU), OICU-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.
org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_main (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (featuring the text of
MMOU).
156
See List of Signatories to the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information – 80, OICUIOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou_siglist (last visited Aug. 20,
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capacity to compel bank records and other beneficial ownership information
and to share the information with their counterparts.157 The MMOU allows
its signatories to help each other properly police their securities markets and
shut down international frauds that may adversely affect capital markets and
their investors, creating a seamless enforcement network among its
membership.
As great as the IOSCO MMOU is, however, it is only the beginning.
First, international agreements to cooperate are only as effective as the
regulatory authorities who must give them effect, and many still lack basic
powers. Second, as discussed throughout this Article, securities authorities
cannot properly police their markets without access to phone records, ISP
records, emails, hard-drives, testimony, asset freezes, and provisions for
enforcement of judgments, none of which are mandated in the MMOU. The
U.K. courts have recently rendered an extraordinarily helpful decision to
facilitate an international freeze order and international enforcement of
judgment.158 Someday, these issues will also need to be comprehensively
addressed by the IOSCO community. Until that time, securities fraudsters
will continue to exploit the gaps in international cooperation.
L. Step 12: Securities Authorities Must Develop Surveillance and
Intelligence Capacity
There are many sources that a securities authority should cultivate to
ensure that it receives timely intelligence on market conditions, including
fraud and abuse.
These will include customer complaints, market
surveillance programs, examinations of market intermediaries, referrals from
other domestic and foreign authorities, whistleblowers, and the financial

2011).
157
See generally International Enforcement Assistance, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml (last modified Jan. 20, 2010)
(explaining memorandum of understanding and mutual legal assistance treaties and their
current roles in the SEC regulation framework).
158
The High Court of Justice in London issued an order freezing assets held in the United
Kingdom by a citizen of the United Kingdom who was a defendant in a pending SEC
enforcement action in the United States. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Manterfield, (2008) EWHC 1349 (QB), available at 2008 WL 3819582. The Manterfield
case is summarized in an SEC Press Release. Press Release, SEC, Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Lydia Capital, LLC et al. & United Kingdom Court of Appeal Upholds SEC
Asset Freeze Order Against Defendant in SEC Case Alleging Fraud by a Hedge Fund
Manager (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20872.htm.

2011]

A ROADMAP FOR EMERGING MARKETS

583

press. Securities authorities must have a comprehensive system for intake,
analysis, and tracking of surveillance, complaints, tips, and referrals.
A computerized automated surveillance program is essential for most
modern capital markets to detect market manipulation and insider trading.
The surveillance systems are typically located at the securities authority,
stock exchange, or both. The general concept is fairly simple: the program
must detect unusual trading spikes in either volume or price in a particular
security. Then, public records need to be checked to see if the trading was in
advance of significant corporate announcements (typically these include
mergers, acquisitions, product development, earnings announcements, or
regulatory approvals). If so, this generates an alert indicating possible
insider trading that should be investigated. The investigator must determine
whether the persons trading have an explanation for their unusual trading
other than that they possessed non-public material information. In market
manipulation cases, the surveillance will also seek to identify unusual trading
spikes, but, unlike insider trading, there may not be any public
announcement or other press that would otherwise explain the anomalous
trading.
The stock exchanges should be in regular contact with securities
authorities to discuss alerts or sudden movements and make appropriate and
timely referrals of suspicious trading. The securities authority must ensure
that the exchange is using the proper parameters to obtain the maximum
efficiency from the electronic surveillance system.
M. Step 13: Securities Authorities Should Maintain the Confidentiality of
Investigations
The securities authority must maintain the confidentiality of the
investigative process to protect the integrity of the investigation and the
privacy and reputation of those being investigated. Investigations should not
be construed as an indication of wrongdoing by any person, unless and until
the investigation is complete and the regulatory authority authorizes the
filing of charges. Any concerns about the securities authority’s ability to
compel information that is private and confidential should be tempered by
requirements that staff maintain the confidentiality of the information, but
not by restrictions to the securities authority’s access to the information in
the first instance. Once an enforcement proceeding commences, the
authority should notify the public of the charges, the violations involved, and
the regulator’s rationale for bringing the action.
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N. Step 14: Securities Authorities Should Serve As the “Investor’s
Advocate”
William O. Douglas, the U.S. SEC’s third Chairman from 1937–1939 and
the longest serving U.S. Supreme Court Justice, said that the SEC is the
“investor’s advocate.”159 This philosophy has been the bedrock that has seen
the SEC through seventy-five years of market growth and innovation, and it
is a primary reason that nearly 60% of U.S. households are confident enough
to invest their retirements and children’s education in the capital markets.
These are productive assets available to build and rebuild the economy. The
regulatory structure must be designed to protect their interests and give them
the confidence that their funds are not going to be stolen, that the books are
accurate, and that the system is not rife with insider traders and market
manipulators. Investors will assume the risk of business and economic
cycles, but they will not readily assume the risk that their investment will be
stolen or diminished by securities fraud. Being the investor’s advocate
means that the individual investor, not the large industry firms or corporate
issuers, should be treated as the ultimate client of the securities authority.160
So what specific actions can a securities authority take to be the investor’s
advocate? Investors must see that the regulator is taking appropriate
regulatory and enforcement actions for their benefit. In general, this
requirement can be met by bringing enforcement cases that will serve to
protect the interest of investors, including recovery of assets for defrauded
investors.161 Additionally, the securities laws should require, and the
regulators should ensure, that investors have access to quality information
from issuing companies and the brokerage firms. If a securities authority
focuses its efforts on leveling the playing field for the individuals and small
players, then most market development and regulatory goals will fall into
159
Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the SEC Speaks in 2011 (Feb. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch020411tap.htm.
160
This does not mean that the securities authority serves as private counsel to individual
investors, but rather that it uses its enforcement program to benefit investors as a whole. Even
so, many SEC cases result in the collateral benefit of recovery for the harmed investors.
161
See, e.g., The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.
sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Feb. 28, 2011) (“Common violations that may
lead to SEC investigations include: misrepresentation or omission of important information
about securities; manipulating the market prices of securities; stealing customers’ funds or
securities; violating broker-dealers’ responsibility to treat customers fairly; insider trading
(violating a trust relationship by trading on material, non-public information about a security);
and selling unregistered securities.”).
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place. A capital market regulator should ask this fundamental question in
connection with every regulatory and enforcement action: “How is this
action we are considering today going to benefit investors?”
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulators can never keep up with the dynamic innovation of a wellfunctioning capital market, and perhaps this is as it should be. They must,
however, keep up with the frauds and abuses on the market. While the key
elements that have been identified in this Article may be some of the best
available today, of overriding importance is to give a securities authority a
broad mandate and flexible tools that it can use to adapt to ever-changing
market conditions and to deal with the increasing sophistication of those who
abuse the market and investors. The government authorities and the
securities industry share the same fundamental goals, which are to attract
investors, lower the cost of capital, and develop the market. Getting this
formula right can unleash the fullest potential of the capital markets, which
will create jobs, eliminate poverty, and increase the standard of living for
future generations.

